Abolishing the Senate: Should Canada follow Ireland?

Senate reform has been in the news on both sides of the Atlantic recently, with both Ireland and Canada actively debating whether to keep, reform or abolish their respective Upper Houses of Parliament.  The debate in Canada was sparked by the Harper government's proposals to reform the Senate, but has been back in the news mainly due to a series of scandals involving Senators.  In Ireland, the issue has been pushed to the forefront by the Kenny government's proposal to abolish Seanad Eireann (the Irish Senate), which goes to a national referendum on October 4th.  The abolition of the Seanad  is part of a larger government programme of constitutional reform, but seems to have garnered public support largely as a cost-saving measure.

As a Canadian with Irish citizenship, I have been following with interest the debate in both countries.  Apparently I am not the only one: politicians in Canada are reported to be watching with interest the possible countdown to extinction of the Seanad.

There are a number of obvious similarities between the Canadian Senate and Seanad Eireann.  Both are based in the British Parliamentary model of a bicameral Parliament, or one made up of two houses, where the Upper House was meant to act as a check and balance, or a chamber of "sober second thought".  However, in both countries, the Senate has too often been used as a convenient place to house political cronies, and both have had their share of political scandal over the years.

There are some obvious differences between the two Senates as well.  While Canadian Senators are appointed until age 75, and entirely on the advice of the Prime Minister, the Taoiseach (the Irish Prime Minister) appoints only 11 of the 60 members of the Seanad.  Another 6 are elected by graduates of certain Irish universities, and the remaining 43 are elected through a complex panel system by an electorate consisting of TD's (Irish MP's), Senators and local councillors.  Irish Senators are elected only until Parliament is dissolved prior to the next general election, so they serve a maximum term of 5 years before seeking re-election.

The two Senates also differ in terms of powers.  While the Seanad can only delay the passage of legislation approved by the Dail (the Irish House of Commons), the Canadian Senate has somewhat more power, having the ability to vote down legislation altogether.

Finally, while Seanad Eireann can be abolished through the support of a simple majority of voters in a national referendum (like other changes to Ireland's constitution), Canada's Senate can only be reformed or abolished with the support of a certain number of Provinces. 

Proponents of Senate abolition in Canada are quick to highlight the similarities between the two Houses, and have also been quick to point out that Ireland would join a growing number of countries that have abolished their upper chamber, including New Zealand and some Nordic countries.  They further point to the fact that many of the small democracies that emerged post-communism have chosen not to have a second chamber at all.  The implication is that Canada should follow this lead, and eliminate the Senate.

However, this analysis misses one vital, fundamental difference between Canada and most countries that have no second chamber. Canada is a geographically large federal state: it was made up of separate colonies who joined together to form one large country, with significant regional differences. It has both a federal and a provincial level of government.  Like other large federal countries such as the United States, Australia and Germany, Canada's Senate is meant to provide balanced representation of these different regional interests, and ensure that the voice of smaller regions is not drowned out by larger ones.  In fact, equal representation of regions is one of the main reasons the Canadian Senate exists, and one of the reasons smaller provinces were willing to sign on to Confederation in the first place. 

Ireland, on the other hand is a relatively small unitary state.  It has no state or provincial level of government. And while there are certainly regional differences, they are simply not on the same geographic scale as Canada's.  In fact, most, if not all of the countries that Senate abolitionists point to as examples of countries with no second chamber, tend to be small, unitary countries like Ireland.  Getting rid of the second chamber might make sense for countries like New Zealand, Estonia or Sweden, which are relatively small and have no state or provincial level of government.  However, most large, federal states like Canada have chosen to keep their second chamber.

So while Ireland's experience with the Seanad is interesting to politicos, it's not an example Canadians should blindly follow.  As the debate on the future of the Senate continues to unfold in Canada, we need to bear in mind the uniqueness of our own particular situation, and the fact that our reasons for wanting to keep or kill our Senate are likely very different than Ireland's.

Is the Senate stuck with Patrick Brazeau and Mike Duffy?

A couple of Senators have been in the news lately for all of the wrong reasons.

Senator Patrick Brazeau was removed from the Conservative caucus after being arrested at his Gatineau home, due to an alleged incident of domestic abuse.  Brazeau, the youngest current Senator, has been a controversial figure since his Senate appointment in 2009, and has recently faced media scrutiny over a variety of issues, including the news he used his former father-in-law's on-reserve address to claim his income as tax exempt from 2004 to 2008.  Brazeau is also under investigation by a Senate committee for possible abuse of his Senate housing allowance.  Senators who live more than 100 km from Ottawa can have a second residence in the capital region and receive up to $21,000 a year to cover that expense.  Brazeau was apparently claiming his father's address as his primary residence, and then collecting the housing allowance for the house he rents in Gatineau.

However, while he is no longer a Conservative Senator, Brazeau can continue to sit in the Senate as an independent, although he faces possible suspension.

Another Senator who has found himself in hot water over his housing allowance is Mike Duffy, who was appointed as a Senator for Prince Edward Island in 2008.  Duffy, who grew up in P.E.I. but has lived in Ottawa for decades, has apparently been claiming a cottage in Cavendish as his primary residence, and then claiming the taxpayer-funded allowance for his home in Ottawa. 

However, in Duffy's case, the residence issue runs a little deeper: while there are very few qualifications for the position of Senator, one of them is that the Senator has to reside in the Province that they represent.  And it would seem that Duffy, while claiming to be resident in P.E.I., pays the non-resident tax rate for his P.E.I. property, does not have a P.E.I. health card (though he recently aked the government to fast-track his application for one) and is registered to vote in Ontario.  All of which raises the issue of whether Duffy was even eligible to be appointed as Senator for P.E.I. in the first place.

Unfortunately, with Canada's appointed Senate, Canadians don't have the option of voting anyone out.  So unless Stephen Harper succeeds in his bid for senate reform (which I hope he does), regardless of any wrongdoing, we might be stuck with these Senators until they turn 75.  For Brazeau, that's 37 years away.

But isn't there something the Canadian public or the Senate itself could do in the meantime?  The rules of the Senate do allow the Senate to suspend a Senator (with pay) and further provide that a Senator who is charged with an offence that may be indictable is immediately placed on leave of absence.

However, removal of a Senator is governed by the Constitution Act 1867.  As I mentioned above, Senators must meet certain qualifications to be eligible to be appointed in the first place.  They are (in brief) that a Senator must:

• Be thirty years of age or over;
• Own property valued at $4,000, over and above any debts;
• Own real property in the province for which they are appointed (and within their District in Quebec)
• Be a resident of the province for which they are appointed; and
• Be a natural born or naturalized subject of the Queen.

Senate seats can be vacated due to death, resignation, or retirement, a Senator can only be removed for the following reasons (again, briefly):

• Failure to attend two sessions of Parliament;
• Taking an oath to or becoming a citizen of a "foreign power";
• Declaration of Bankruptcy;
• Conviction for treason or a felony or any "infamous Crime"; and,
• Ceasing to reside or own property in the represented area

While the Constitution doesn't explicitly spell out who has the power to remove a Senator, it does state that any issues with respect to a Senators' qualifications must be determined by the Senate itself.

That is probably good news for Duffy.  While there might be some question about whether he was even qualified to be the Senator for P.E.I., it seems unlikely that the Conservative majority in the Senate would toss him for that.

For Brazeau, the news might not be so good.  While it appears he meets the residency requirements, he may also be facing investigation and criminal charges for domestic abuse, and possibly income tax evasion.  This could lead to jail time or personal bankruptcy, or could result in him failing to meet the property requirement or missing sessions of Parliament, any of which could result in him being turfed.  And unlike Duffy, at this point, it is unlikely he has many friends in the Senate who will plead his case.

Senate Reform: Teaching an Old Dog new Tricks

Maybe it's a slow news week in Ottawa, but the topic of Senate Reform is back on the agenda ... sort of.  The Harper government announced last week that they will be referring their latest senate reform bill to the Supreme Court of Canada for a determination on its constitutionality.  This is a process that could take anywhere from several months to a couple of years.  So while it is back on the agenda, it is not exactly on the front burner just yet.

When I brought up the topic the other day, someone joked that the only thing older than the topic of Senate reform is the senators themselves.  And indeed, the debate over Senate reform has been going on for much of Canada's history.  While it has never been the burning issue of the day, it's an issue that never seems to go away either.  There is something about the Canadian Senate that seems to invite the attention of every new generation of politicians, political scientists and democratic reformers.

The Senate is one of the two houses of the Canadian Parliament along with the House of Commons.  While the Senate is referred to as the Upper Chamber for protocol reasons, the House of Commons is by far the dominant chamber: the government is only responsible to the Commons, only the Commons can initiate money bills, most legislation starts in the Commons, and in practice the Senate rarely rejects a bill passed by the Commons.  The Senate was created at Confederation by what is now known as the Constitution Act 1867, and was styled somewhat on the British House of Lords.

The Senate was intended to counterbalance representation by population in the House of Commons by providing an equal voice to each region.  More seats were added as more provinces were added.  There are now 105 seats: Ontario, Quebec, the Maritimes and the Western Provinces each have 24, Newfoundland and Labrador has 6, and each of the territories have 1.

The Senate was also meant to be a chamber of "sober second thought" where Parliament would have a second chance to consider and scrutinize legislation before it was passed.  A cynic might suggest that the Fathers of Confederation didn't entirely trust the rabble elected to the Commons, and wanted to ensure that the wealthy landowning elite had the final say.  Regardless of the reason, sober second thought has come to be seen as one of the vital constitutional roles of the Senate.

Senators are appointed by the Queen, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.  They were originally appointed for life, but now can only sit until they are 75 years old.  There are some basic qualifications such as residing and owning property in the province they represent, and being a minimum of 30 years of age.   Other than that, the Prime Minister essentially has unfettered power to choose appointees.

While Prime Ministers have occasionally used this power to appoint independents, members of other parties, or groups who are traditionally underrepresented in the Commons, for the most part this power has been used to appoint party loyalists who will dutifully pass government legislation.  As a consequence, the Senate has come to lack the power or the democratic legitimacy to oppose even the most unpopular legislation.  In a particularly egregious example, Brian Mulroney was able to exercise a special power to appoint eight extra Senators in order to overcome Liberal opposition and pass the GST.

For all of these reasons, the Canadian Senate has come to be seen as a bit of an anachronism, particularly compared to other countries that have elected Senates, such as the United States and Australia.  Even the House of Lords now has some elected members.

While some argue that the Senate should simply be abolished, democratic reformers have long championed senate reform, in the belief that an elected, effective Senate could actually serve an important role in our Parliamentary democracy.  In a country where power has become dangerously concentrated in the Prime Minister's Office, an elected Senate could serve as an important check and balance.  But changing from an appointed to an elected Senate would require a constitutional amendment, and meeting the strict requirements of the amending formula is politically very tricky and requires the support of at least 7 of 10 provinces.

To that end, since being elected in 2006, the Conservative Government has tried to strike a difficult balance between a pragmatic reform that can get the necessary political support without necessarily requiring a full-blown constitutional amendment.

Their first effort to let Canadians choose Senators in 2006 missed the mark somewhat.  Bill C-20 called for the government to conduct "consultations" with voters (essentially non-binding federal senate elections) before making senate appointments.  The Bill was rightly criticized for a number of practical and legal problems.

However, while some have accused him of stalling, and while he has made some questionable appointments himself, Harper's desire to see elected Senators seems to be genuine, and he has repeatedly extended the invitation to the Provinces to hold their own Senate elections, with the promise that he will appoint the winning candidates.  To date, only Alberta has taken him up on this invitation.

The latest approach being championed by the government is somewhat different.  Bill C-7 would limit Senators to one nine year term of office (a change that definitely requires a constitutional amendment).  It also sets out a framework for each province to hold its own senate elections, which would be administered by provincial officials.  In an interesting twist, it proposes that instead of being members of  federal political parties, Senators would be members of provincial parties.  Eric Grenier has pointed out this raises the bizarre spectre of having Parti Quebecois and Wildrose Alliance members in the federal Parliament.  While there some obvious political alignment between many of these parties, there is some question as to whether these parties could effectively work together in caucuses or not.

However, the proposal does have some appeal as well.  First, making Senators members of provincial parties creates an added degree of independence from the government, which, combined with the term limits, enables the Senate to act as a true chamber of sober second thought.  The Prime Minister will not be able to control Senators the way he has come to control MP's.  Second, it is arguably aligned with the other main purpose of the Senate, which is to provide a greater voice to the regions.  Third, it might be a practical way of getting more provincial governments on board with Senate reform.

To date, the NDP and Liberals, both federally and provincially, have generally resisted the Tories attempts at Senate reform.  The NDP prefer to abolish the Senate, while the Liberals seem to want to make it part of some larger constitutional reform.  Stephane Dion went as far as to suggest that of all the bills before the House, C-7 is "the most dangerous for the future of our country."

On a practical level, I have a hard time understanding why Liberal and NDP provincial governments in particular have been so reluctant to get on board with Harper's proposal to hold provincial Senate elections.  Had they accepted the invitation, the Tories would not have the stranglehold in the Senate that they currently enjoy, and some of the most controversial pieces of legislation, including the omnibus bills, would have been subjected to more legislative scrutiny.  Further, they could be running candidates who support either different reform proposals, or outright abolition, which would further the debate.

As Grenier suggests, with the greater variety of provincial parties involved, there is a risk the Senate could descend into dysfunctional chaos.  On the other hand, most of these parties have some affinity and common interest, and we might see some cross-party political collaboration and coalition-building, the likes of which we have not seen in Canada in some time.

The Bill also doesn't seem to mandate a particular electoral system, which opens the door to some debate on the appropriate voting system.  The STV system used to elect the Australian senate seems like a logical candidate.

Canadians are understandably wary of having Parliament descent into US-style gridlock, where an elected House and Senate often seem to be working at odds with each other.  However, the proposed reform is actually based more closely on the Australian Senate, which is generally seen to have served as an effective check and balance within their Parliamentary system.  Canada would need to turn its mind to rules that deal with any conflicts between the two Houses.

The Supreme Court will obviously have the final say on constitutionality, but in practice, the proposed legislation will likely work the same as the Tories fixed election date legislation: it will be politically enforced rather than legally enforced.  It ultimately depends on the provinces acting in good faith in holding the elections, and the Prime Minister acting in good faith in appointing the election winners to the Senate.  Nothing short of an actual constitutional amendment could create an elected Senate that doesn't depend on goodwill.  That being said, if we try the proposed system, and it works, perhaps it will pave the way to actual constitutional reform.  If it doesn't work, we can discard and try again with a different model.  One of the virtues of this approach is that the kinks can be worked out before it is constitutionally set in stone.

Ultimately, an elected Senate would have more political legitimacy and power than the current appointed model, and could act as an important check and balance on the currently unfettered powers of a Prime Minister.  The Senate could finally serve the purposes that it has been meant to serve all along: providing balanced regional representation and providing a true sober second thought on proposed legislation.  They say you can't teach an old dog new tricks, but there is no reason you can't breathe new life into an old institution.

Could Peter Kelly have gone the way of Rob Ford?

With the news of Rob Ford's removal from office in Toronto for conflict of interest, some Haligonians have been asking themselves whether the same thing could have happened to former mayor Peter Kelly.  With Kelly having chosen not to run in the last election, it's something of a moot point, but an interesting question about conflict of interest nonetheless.

The question refers to the cash for concerts scandal, during which Mayor Kelly was accused of having contravened the HRM Charter by signing off on a loan to a private concern promoter, an arrangement which was kept secret from council.  The scandal only came to light when the promoter failed to repay the loan, and resulted in the resignation of HRM CAO Wayne Anstey.  However, Kelly refused to step down as mayor despite calls for his resignation.

But it's what happened next that raises the potential conflict of interest.  The Auditor General's report on the scandal was tabled at council on June 14, 2011.  At that meeting, council decided against a motion to hold an inquiry into the matter.  At the subsequent meeting on June 21, 2011 council heard and defeated a motion to censure Kelly and suspend him as mayor for a week for his role in the scandal.

While some informed observers at the time suggested that Kelly would have to be removed as presiding officer at June 14, 2011 debate, I am told that Peter Kelly refused to step down from his position as chair of the council meeting at either meeting, despite the fact council was considering motions to conduct an inquiry into his behaviour, and ultimately to censure him. 

Mayor Kelly did decline to chair a subsequent meeting discussing the cash for concerts scandal in May 2012.  However, he referred to his refusal to chair as a "perceived conflict of interest" rather than a contravention of the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act.  Had there been a conflict of interest under the MCIA, Kelly would not only have had to resign the chair, but remove himself from the debate on the issue altogether.

By contrast, Rob Ford initially got in trouble for using his position (and his letterhead) as a city councillor to solicit donations to his private charitable foundation.  He was found by the city's ethics commissioner to be in breach of the Toronto city council's code of conduct and ordered to repay the money.  When the ethics commissioner's report came before council in 2010, despite being warned he was in conflict of interest, then councillor Ford chose to participate in the debate.  Mr. Ford refused to repay the amount as ordered.  The issue came before council in 2012, and despite again being warned of his conflict of interest, Mr. Ford spoke to and voted in the debate.  Council ultimately overturned the previous ruling and did not require Ford to repay.

An application was brought by a citizen of Toronto to have Mr. Ford dismissed as mayor.  In a detailed ruling released on November 26, 2012, Justice Hackland found that Mr. Ford was guilty of a conflict of interest, that Ford's actions were not the results of inadvertence or a good faith error, and that Ford must therefore be removed as mayor, although he was not barred from running for office again.

It would be impossible  to speculate on how a Nova Scotia court might have ruled on the conflict of interest in the Kelly situation.  There are some obvious factual differences between the two cases.  Rob Ford's removal did seem to turn in part on fact he was advised he was in conflict of interest, and chose to disregard.  It is not clear of whether Kelly was advised of his conflict of interest, and what role (if any) that played in his decision.  In addition, the Act is limited to direct of indirect "pecuniary" (i.e. financial) interests.  In Ford's case, the financial interest was clear: he would otherwise have been required to repay the donations.  In Kelly's case, the financial interest is a little less clear.  Kelly would not have had to repay the concert loan, although it is possible an inquiry might have resulted in charges for breaches of the Charter, including fines, or that a suspension would have entailed loss of salary, either of which would constitute a pecuniary interest.

A further reason it is hard to speculate is that the Ford decision may well be appealed, and we might get a different statement of the law from a higher court.

What I can say is that Nova Scotia's Municipal Conflict of Interest Act is nearly identical to the Ontario MCIA under which Rob Ford's was removed.  So where a mayor, councillor or municipal committee member is in a conflict of interest (as defined in the Act), it would be open to a citizen to bring an application to have that person removed from office.  And while a Nova Scotia court would not be bound to follow the Ford ruling, it would certainly have to consider it, given the similarities between the pieces of legislation.

The Act has its exclusions and defences, so removal is certainly not guaranteed.  However, where a conflict of interest occurs, Haligonians have the same accountability tool available to us as the people of Toronto.  All it requires is  one bold citizen prepared to prosecute the case.

Election Day in Halifax: The Start of a new Era?

It's election day in Halifax, and there is only one certain outcome: Halifax will have a new mayor.  It's the end of the Peter Kelly era, as the man who has held the mayor's chair for the last twelve years exits under a cloud of scandal.

The assumption seems to be that former Dartmouth-Cole Harbour MP Mike Savage is a shoo-in to replace Kelly.   Most of the polling showed him with a decisive lead over his closest competitors, retired police officer Tom Martin, and business owner Fred Connors.  It remains to be seen if either Martin or Connors has been able to close the gap in the last few weeks of campaigning.

Regardless of who assumes the office of mayor, they face a number of challenges.  Halifax's violent crime rate is among the highest in Canada.  An infrastructure deficit means taxpayers could face a significant tab (estimated by Halifax Water to be in the order of $2 billion) to fix crumbling water and sewer infrastructure in the next several years.  Halifax continues to underinvest in its downtown and urban core, and the city continues to sprawl at an unsustainable rate, failing to meet even the modest goals of its own 25 year regional plan.

However, the biggest challenge the mayor will face may be trying to get council on the same page and moving the city in the same direction.  The previous council was described by many observers as "dysfunctional".  Some councillors continue to put narrow parochial interests, no matter how small, ahead of the good of the municipality.  Council has reversed its own decisions, and then sometimes reversed again, on more than one occasion.  Council has been highly criticized for making many decisions behind closed doors in "in camera" sessions.  And there is often a lack of public consultation on key issues: the costly Bayers Road/102 widening appears to be proceeding, despite a complete lack of public engagement or even a proper council hearing on the project.

Reality is that there will likely be many familiar faces on the new council.  Barring a few upsets, due to the new district structure, some of the toughest races involve incumbents against incumbents.  It is likely that the new council will look allot like the old one.

If Savage wins as expected, he will need to demonstrate the skills in working across political lines that he showed as an MP.  If he can pull off the upset, Martin will need every bit of the street smarts he learned as a police officer.  Similarly, Connors will need to show he can win over councillors with his ideas and enthusiasm.

Haligonians will need to temper their expectations with the reality that we have a weak mayoral system, which does not provide much power and authority to the mayor.  He will have only one vote amongst 17 on council, and although his role as chair gives him some ability to control the agenda, that power is limited.  The exercise sometimes looks a bit like herding cats.  It remains to be seen if the new, smaller council size makes this task any easier.

The mayor will also have to deal with CAO Richard Butts, who in the year and a half since he joined the municipality from Toronto, seems to have carved out a large sphere of authority for himself.

Although some people have been underwhelmed by the mayoral campaign itself, I think there is one positive thing we can take from it.  As an observer, I have seen a huge upsurge of new energy and new ideas around how to move this city forward.  There is a sense that Halifax has tremendous potential and opportunities.   There are numerous ways citizens can engage in moving the city forward, including the regional plan five year review, which is ongoing.

Regardless of who sits in the mayor's chair, or any other seat in council chamber, as citizens it is up to us over the next four years to hold their feet to the fire and ensure that we seize some of these opportunities, bring some of these new ideas to life, and see Halifax realize on its tremendous potential.

Of Lawn Signs, Landlords and Tenants ...

With municipal elections fast approaching, some interesting legal questions have come up.  A friend of mine woke up the other day to find an election sign on his lawn which he hadn't authorized.  He phoned the candidate and found out the sign had been authorized by his landlord's mother.

This situation raises some interesting questions.  What right to landlords have to put up election signs on rental properties?  What right do tenants have to stop them?   And what right do tenants have to put up signs of their own?  What about condo owners and condo corporations?

I'll deal with the last question first, as the answer there is somewhat clear.  In Nova Scotia (as in some other jurisdictions), s. 54C of our Municipal Elections Act provides that a landlord cannot "prohibit a tenant from displaying election advertising posters on the premises leased by the tenant".  Similarly, a condo corporation cannot prohibit the owner of a condominium unit from displaying election advertising posters on the premises of that person's unit. 

However, a landlord or condo corporation can "set reasonable conditions relating to the size or type of election advertising posters that may be displayed on the premises and may prohibit the display of election advertising posters in common areas of the building in which the premises are found".  There are similar provisions in both the provincial Elections Act and the Canada Elections Act, so similar rules apply in provincial and federal elections as well.

These provisions have not, to the best of my knowledge, been argued in court in Nova Scotia, so it remains to be seen what kind of restrictions our courts would consider to be "reasonable".

However, it's important to note that the tenant's right is limited to the leased premises.  Most leases make a distinction between the premises actually leased by the tenant, which the tenant generally has the exclusive right to use and occupy, and common areas, such as halls, stairways, driveways, etc., which are used by some or all tenants.  There may also be areas of the landlord's property that aren't covered by the lease at all, such as a front lawn.

For those of you in apartment buildings, the leased premises are usually just the apartment itself.  So you may be able to put a sign in the window (subject to reasonable restrictions on size and type), but not much beyond that.  For those of you leasing entire houses, including the yard, you may be able to put the sign on the front lawn if that is part of the leased premises.  For those of you renting parts of houses or buildings, it is more of a gray area.  In each case, a careful review of your lease to determine what is and isn't included in the leased premises is essential.

As to what right the landlord has to put up an election sign, things are a little less clear.  Elections legislation and the Residential Tenancies Act don't deal specifically with this point, so it will really come down to the specific terms of your lease.  Again, your lease should identify the leased premises, common areas and so forth, and hopefully spells out what rights and responsibilities you and the landlord have with respect to each area.  Generally speaking, the landlord only has limited rights to enter the leased premises, but more rights with respect to common areas, and can do what they want on unleased portions of the property.  So if you live in an apartment, chances are your landlord can't put up an election sign in your apartment, but is likely within their rights to erect an election sign on the front lawn.  If you live in a house, and the leased premises include the whole property, then you likely can prevent the landlord from putting up an election sign on the property. Again, a careful review of your lease will be necessary. 

My friend was ultimately able to resolve the situation by calling his landlord.  And that should generally be your first way of dealing with this issue.  If that fails, you can always contact the residential tenancies program to find out more about your rights and how to assert them.  And, if necessary, you can contact a lawyer to help you interpret your lease.

This blog represents my own personal views and is provided for information purposes.   It is NOT meant to be legal advice.  If you require legal advice, you should consult a lawyer regarding your specific circumstances.